A stochastic dominance approach to the measurement of discrimination

This note suggests a bridge between stochastic dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 [17], 1973 [18]), inequality measurement (Atkinson, 1970 [1]) and discrimination measurement (Gastwirth, 1975 [10]). Discrimination orderings are defined and illustrated through discrimination curves, in the same spirit as stochastic dominance analysis. The main result, which links the second order discrimination curve and the Gastwirth discrimination index, also generalizes the equivalence between Generalized Lorenz dominance and second order stochastic dominance.     

A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH PERSONAL INCOME DISPERSION

We introduce non‐homothetic preferences in the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, and enquire about the effects of a change in income dispersion on the firms’ optimal decisions and market equilibrium. Income dispersion, modeled as a mean preserving spread, is shown to affect only the degree of product differentiation under the standard negligibility hypothesis on the firms’ decision making process, while it generates a positive co‐movement of demand and demand elasticity, when this assumption is removed and the price index effect is taken into account.     

Income concentration and market demand

We analyze the effects of income concentration and income dispersionon market demand and its elasticity. We show that, followingan increase in income concentration towards the middle (measuredby variations in mean preserving spread), the increase in demandfaced by firms which serve at the margin middle income consumers,is associated with an increase in price elasticity—accordingly,the positive effects of the size of the market becoming widerare amplified by a higher degree of competition. Our resultshold for a large number of possible income distributions.     

Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly

We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed oligopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We start with a baseline duopoly model and compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way they are affected by product substitutability. This allows us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other specific government’s commitments on the objective function of the public management can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the objective function and Stackelberg leadership. Since optimal manipulation rules change as new dimensions are added, we also derive the optimal rules under oligopoly, quadratic costs, and competition of international firms. This fairly general unified framework allows to discuss the impact of these factors on the government’s implementation policies of the optimal manipulation rules.     

The Breakdown of Idiosyncratic Volatility Into Expected and Unexpected Components and Its Effects on Stock Returns in Brazil

Based on studies of idiosyncratic volatility developed in the recent literature, this study analyzes its relation with expected returns through the breakdown of idiosyncratic volatility in the Brazilian stock market and presents evidence of the importance of expected idiosyncratic volatility for asset pricing. We study the impact of the expected and unexpected components of idiosyncratic volatility on the returns of shares listed on the BOVESPA between 2004 and 2011. The results show a strong positive and significant relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and returns. This evidence is highlighted when we use unexpected idiosyncratic volatility to control for unexpected returns. Additional robustness tests, controlling for size and momentum effects, also have positive and significant coefficients, corroborating previous findings.     

Productivity-Wage Gaps Among Age Groups: Does the ICT Environment Matter?

This paper disentangles the age-productivity-wage nexus by estimating productivity and wage equations with longitudinal employer-employee panel data for Belgium. Results indicate that workers above 49 years are significantly less productive than their younger colleagues. Moreover, while relative productivities across age groups are not found to differ significantly between ICT and non ICT firms, the upward sloping age-wage profile appears to be somewhat steeper in ICT firms. Yet, whatever the ICT environment, findings show that young workers are paid below and older workers above their marginal productivity. This pattern is in line with the deferred payment model developed by Lazear (J Polit Econ 87:1261–1284, 1979).     

VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

The paper analyses the effects of income concentration on the behaviour of a duopoly with vertical product differentiation and uncovered market. By using a trapezoid distribution, we solve explicitly for market equilibrium as a function of a mean preserving spread of the income distribution. We show that overall more concentrated incomes imply stronger product differentiation, as the presence of a large share of middle‐income consumers stimulates a price competition, whose effects are dampened through an enlargement of the quality spread. While the high‐quality advantage and market coverage increase unambiguously in the degree of income concentration, the behaviour of prices is non‐monotone in the distribution parameter.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the redistributive effects of Social Security Reform

This paper analyses the general equilibrium implications of reforming pay-as-you-go pension systems in an economy with heterogeneous agents, human capital investment and capital–skill complementarity. It shows that increasing funding, by raising savings, delivers in the long run higher physical and human capital and therefore higher output, but also higher across-group wage and income inequality. It also shows that the general equilibrium effects induced by this reform affect groups' sizes in a way that the higher across-group inequality generated by more funding goes with a larger share of the population against redistribution.